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CHAPTER 16
Religious Stalemate and Confessional Alignments: 
Dynamics and Stagnation in the Confederation 
fr om 1531 to 1618
Thomas Maissen1
16.1 Introduction
In 1513 Appenzell became the 13th full member of the Confederation.2 Basel 
and Schaffhausen joined the Confederates, who had already proven their mili- 
tary prowess in the hinterland of these two imperial cities during the Swabian 
War of 1499, a decade earlier. It seemed it was only a matter of time until other 
associated district allies (Zugewandte Orte)—satellites of the League already
1 I am most grateful to Angela Roberts and also to Felicitas Eichhom and Amy Bumett for their 
help in editing this paper in English.
2 For the political and religious stmcture of Switzerland in the 16th centmry, see Hans 
Bemer, Ulrich Gabler, and Hans Rudolf Guggisberg, “Schweiz,” in Die Territorien des Reichs 
im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung, vol. 5: Der Siidwesten, (eds.) Anton 
Schindling and Walter Ziegler (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1993), 278-323. For the state of the art 
in Swiss historiography consult the articles in hls, accessible in German, French, and Italian 
at http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/index.php. Still useful for the factual history is Peter Stadler, 
“Das Zeitalter der Gegenreformation,” in Handbuch der Schweizer Geschichte, 2 vols. (Zmich: 
Berichthaus, 1972), 1: 571-672; and for the constitutional history, see Hans Conrad Peyer, Ver- 
fassungsgeschichte der alten Schweiz (Zurich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 1978). For 
religious and church history in general, see Phster, kgs; Lukas Vischer and Rudolf Dellsperg- 
er (eds.), OkumenischeKirchengeschichte der Schweiz (Fribourg: Paulus Verlag, 1998); Gordon, 
Swiss Reformation; recent scholarship is discussed in Thomas Maissen, “Konfessionskulturen 
in der fruhneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft. Eine Einfuhrung,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift 
fur Retigions- und Kulturgeschichte 101 (2007), 225-46; and Andre Holenstein, “Reformation 
und Konfessionalisierung in der Geschichtsforschung der Deutschschweiz,” arg 100 (2009), 
65-87. For recent overviews in English, see Clive H. Church and Randolph C. Head, A Concise 
History of Switzerland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 73-103, and the con- 
tributions of Andreas Wiirgler, “'The League of Discordant Members’ or How the Old Swiss 
Confederation Operated and How Has it Managed to Survive for so Long?,” and Francisca 
Loetz, “Bridging the Gap: Confessionalisation in Switzerland,” both in The Republican ALter- 
native. The Netherlands and Switzerland compared, (eds.) Andre Holenstein, Thomas Mais- 
sen, and Maarten Prak (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 29-50 and 75-97 
respectively.
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from the 15th century—would become full members as well. The most likely of 
these associates to enter the league next was St. Gallen. At this time there were 
actually two St. Gallens: the city and the abbey. This schism in St. Gallen was 
made irremediable during the Reformation when the prince-abbot remained 
loyal to the Roman Church while the city followed the Protestant reformer 
Joachim Vadian. One motive for this choice can be ascribed to simple territo- 
rial ambitions: the burghers of the city, which still ended at the town wall, saw 
the Reformation as an opportunity to win a territory of their own if they could 
secularize the abbot’s state that surrounded the city.3
St. Gallen’s burghers embraced a rationale similar to that of many other cit- 
ies in the Holy Roman Empire, among them Basel, Geneva, Chur, Constance, 
Strasbourg, and Augsburg: they followed the Protestant faith, among other rea- 
sons, to liberate themselves completely from their bishops who also acted as 
traditional secular lords. In St. Gallen’s neighboring region of Allgau, the impe- 
rial city of Kempten was able to purchase the sovereign rights from its own 
prince-abbot after the Peasants’ War had weakened him considerably. Kemp- 
ten subsequently formed a small territory and became a prominent represen- 
tative of the early Reformation; it was among the hrst to sign the Augsburg 
Confession. Given the close ties that had been established by the Confederates 
in the preceding decades to urban and rural areas north of the Rhine such as
3 See Chapter 6 above.
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Basel and Schaffhausen, it seemed likely that in the early 16th century the Ref- 
ormation would further strengthen alliances that opposed the predominance 
of the Habsburgs and the Swabian League in southwest Germany, a predomi- 
nance that had already been affected by the Swabian War.
16.2 The End of Territorial Expansion during the Reformation
In the aforementioned cases, both the prelate and his city were seen as poten- 
tial allies of the Confederates. However, after the Reformation there were fun- 
damental disagreements in preferences: the Catholics sided with the prelates, 
the Protestants with the burghers. The only thing the Swiss eventually agreed 
upon was to receive neither in a closer partnership that could have dangerous 
and unpredictable consequences. This was even the case for the city of Biel 
(Bienne), which was directly adjacent to Bern’s territory. While the Reforma- 
tion reinforced the Biel burghers' autonomy from their lord, the prince-bishop 
of Basel, their Protestant creed also meant that they could not strengthen rela- 
tions with the Confederation because the Catholic cantons formed the major- 
ity and resisted an increase in the number of their religious opponents. Still, 
Biel retained a particular alliance (Burgrecht or combourgeoisie, granting citi- 
zenship to non-residents) with Protestant Bern and with the Catholic cantons 
of Solothurn and Fribourg; it was also a regular guest at the Confederal Diet.
Such visits to the Diet became rare in the case of Rottweil in Swabia and 
Mulhouse (Mulhausen) in Alsace, two allies who, despite their distance from 
the Confederation’s territories, had participated in several military cam- 
paigns and had entered into formal treaties with the Confederation by 1463 
(Rottweil) and 1515 (Mulhouse). Rottweil remained Catholic because, inter 
alia, it housed an imperial court of law (Hofgericht). However, even the Catho- 
lic cantons detached themselves from the exposed Rottweil during the Thirty 
Years’ War, whereas Mulhouse, after joining the Reformed in 1528 and not least 
because of its strong contacts with neighboring Basel, managed to remain an 
ally of the Protestant cantons until 1798, when it was integrated into revolu- 
tionary France. By the early 16th century, the Confederates had severed their 
links to other external territories that were sometimes labeled Zugewandte in 
the preceding century, including the Duchy of Wiirttemberg, the counties of 
Montbeliard and Arona, and the imperial city of Besangon.
Among the irregular guests of the Diet there were also two other confed- 
erations whose constitutions were similar to the Swiss: the Valais (Wallis) and 
the Three Leagues of Graubunden (the Grisons)—namely, the Grey League in 
the west, the League of God’s House in the south and east, and the League of
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the Ten Jurisdictions in the northeast. Both the Valais and the Three Leagues 
had subjects who spoke Romance languages: the French Lower Valais and the 
Italian Valtellina, respectively. Both also depended formally on an ecclesiasti- 
cal prince: the bishops of Sion and Chur, respectively. However, the mostly ru- 
ral communities (Genchtsgemeinden in the Grisons, Zenden—tithings—in the 
Valais) were sovereign, even in religious matters; they therefore found them- 
selves increasingly split by religious strife during the 16th century. The Three 
Leagues eventually formed a confessional rag rug while the Valaisan patricians, 
who flirted with Protestantism around 1600, later turned back to the Catholic 
Church. In spite of comparable challenges, the political bonds with the Swiss 
were, in general, looser than they had been in the 15th century because the 
communities were busy with their own religious affairs and because joint mili- 
tary campaigns stopped after 1512 (Graubiinden) and 1536 (Valais) when the 
aforementioned subject territories were conquered.4
With the conquest of the Vaud and other Savoyard territories in 1536, the 
Reformation brought an end to territorial expansion not only for the Confed- 
eration but also for its allies. Together they formed a shape that is similar to 
present-day Switzerland and demonstrates unusual territorial continuity. The 
Confederation in its strict sense remained, until 1798, within the “natural” bor- 
ders formed by the thirteen full members, the cantons between the Rhine, the 
Jura, and the ridge of the Alps.
16.3 The Option of a Reformed Alliance in Southwest Germany
In the 1520s the situation was quite different. The German Peasants’ War of 
1525 was often inspired by a desire to “turn Swiss,” a lure that was particularly 
attractive to rural communes that sought to follow the model of Schwyz or 
Appenzell, where those in rural areas lived free from princely, noble, or urban 
rule.5 However, it is important to note that the Swiss authorities usually did not 
foster social unrest in their own neighborhood for the obvious reason that it 
could harm them. The cities, and their elites in particular, depended on a sys- 
tem of soccage, and serfs still existed in several places including Zurich. Facing 
social unrest in its own rural territories in the form of Anabaptism, among oth- 
ers, and very isolated within the Confederation between 1523 and 1527, Zurich
4 BuncLner Geschichte, vol. 2: Friihe Neuzeit, (eds.) Jiirg Simonett, Roger Sablonier, and Georg 
Jager (Chur: Verlag Biindner Monatsblatt, 2000); see also Chapters 7 and 8 above.
5 Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Tuming Swiss: Cities and Empire, 1450-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985).
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did not limit its search for religious alliances (Christiiches Burgrecht, hence a 
combourgeoisie among fellow Christians) to the regular Confederates. Its hrst 
ally in faith was Constance in 1527. Eventually, Zurich's most important ally 
would become Bem. It entered into a Burgrecht in 1528, as did the city of St. 
Gallen; Basel, Schaffhausen, Biel, and Mulhouse followed in 1529 and Stras- 
bourg in 1530. In the same year, Zurich signed a treaty with Philipp 1, Landgrave 
of Hesse, the Protestant leader who tried in vain to reconcile Zwingli and Lu- 
ther in Marburg in 1529. Zurich also supported the Protestant Duke of Wlirt- 
temberg, Ulrich, whom the emperor had banned in 1519 and whom Philipp of 
Hesse managed to restore to power in 1534.
Like these princes, the cities in the southwest were closely tied to Zwingli’s 
memorialism in the Lord’s Supper and often formed their church ordinances 
according to the model established in Zurich. Several cities tried to establish a 
middle ground between Zurich and Wittenberg. With this aim, and supported 
by Constance, Memmingen, and Lindau, Strasbourg’s reformers, Martin Bucer 
and Wolfgang Capito, penned the Tetrapolitan Confession in 1530 at the Diet 
of Augsburg. The Lirst Helvetic Confession (Confessio Helvetica Prior), written 
by Bullinger and the leading reformers of Bern, Basel, and Zurich in 1536, met 
with the approval of Bucer and Capito, at least in the Latin version; Leo Jud’s 
German translation was more unambiguously Zwinglian. Later in the same 
year Bucer and Capito also signed the Wittenberg Concord with Luther, who 
remained very hostile to the Swiss “spiritualists” whom he held responsible 
for fostering religious and social unrest. Bullinger had equally negative feel- 
ings about his adversary in Wittenberg, especially after Luther refused a Zurich 
Bible that was offered to him as a gift in 1543. By that time Upper Germany 
had slowly moved towards Lutheranism by accepting the Wittenberg Concord. 
This was reflected in the Duke of Wiirttemberg’s dismissal of Ambrosius Blarer, 
the Zwinglian reformer of Constance whom he had employed to reform the 
University of Tiibingen, in 1538.
Although the Lutherans eventually prevailed, for more than two decades 
Upper Swabia, from Constance and Kempten down to Ulm and Augsburg, re- 
mained open to Zwinglian theology and to ministers from Zurich who contin- 
ued to influence both the pastors and secular authorities.6 It seemed a distinct 
possibility that the Swiss “large league of lands in Upper Germany” (grofier 
Pund obertutscher Landen) could become a vast federation centered around 
Lake Constance. This was a development that could still be imagined within 
the encompassing framework of the Holy Roman Empire. The Swiss cantons
6 Peer Friess, “Der Einfluss des Zwinglianismus auf die Reformation der oberschwabischen 
Reichsstadte,” ZwingLiana 34 (2007), 5-27.
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had not adopted the imperial reforms of 1495, but they always acknowledged 
the emperor and Empire as the legal origin of their political power and asked 
newly elected emperors to conhrm the privileges that granted their dominion. 
The political constitution of the cities, often dominated by the guilds, and their 
political aims, such as social control by means of marital courts, were very sim- 
ilar in Swabia and Switzerland. Furthermore, the economic interdependence 
and commercial ties—for example in grain trade—between these areas was 
very strong.
Constance, Zurich’s ally in the hrst Christliches Burgrecht, was not only 
eager to inherit the territories of the prince-bishop of Constance, who left for 
Meersburg in 1527; it also aspired at winning the Thurgau, which formed its 
natural hinterland but had become a mandated territory (Gemeine Herrschaft) 
of seven cantons in 1460. Of these Zurich was the closest and the strongest. The 
six other lords—Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, and Glarus—were 
almost all hrm Catholics and lived in constant fear that Zurich would hand 
over the common territory to Constance in order to establish a vast Reformed 
network. Indeed, since Constance was situated on the left bank of the Rhine 
it was not inconceivable that it should seek to fulhll the old dream of many 
of its burghers and join the Confederation, as neighboring Schaffhausen, lo- 
cated on the right side of the Rhine, had done in 1501. Such changes would have 
undermined and possibly overstretched the defensive alliance that protected 
the autonomy of the small cantons in central Switzerland. They would also 
have threatened Habsburg possessions in Swabia, including the districts 
(Oberamt) of Stockach and Altdorf and could have potentially formed a wedge 
between Austria and its Voriande in Alsace and the Breisgau. Since the Confed- 
erates, though still members of the Holy Roman Empire, were almost autono- 
mous in their foreign and military policy and since their mercenaries regularly 
fought for France, a development along these lines would have been seen as 
a threat to the Empire as a whole and in particular to the Austrian and Swabian 
circles.
16.4 The Reaction of the Catholic Cantons in Central Switzerland
This perspective met with opposition from Zurich’s allies in central Switzerland 
who insisted on the common historical tradition and shared rules both with a 
religious and a political perspective. In the Christliche Burgrechte, Zurich had 
left out the usual proviso of its Swiss Confederates. Its new religious alliances 
announced a radically changed Confederation that would be characterized 
by Reformed faith and dominated by the cities, notably by Zurich and Bem.
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A large league of Protestant towns in the Swiss plateau and Swabia would have 
reduced the Catholic cantons to peripheral actors in every sense. This fear led 
to a kind of renversement des ailiances when the Catholic cantons drew closer 
to the house of Habsburg: Lucerne and the inner cantons had always been the 
hercest opponents of this “arch enemy,” whereas Zurich, in spite of its Swiss ob- 
ligations, had often acted as a Habsburg partner or at least mediator in the 15th 
century. This was certainly true during the Erbeinung, the permanent peace 
contracted in 1477 and renewed in 1511 as well as in 1519, when Zurich became 
the leading supporter of Charles v’s claim for the imperial crown, and in 1521, 
when it rejected the alliance with France. It is telling that it was the prince- 
bishop of Constance who brokered the Christliche Vereinigung of 1529, a pact 
between Archduke Ferdinand 1, the brother of Charles v, and the Fiinf Orte, the 
hve cantons in central Switzerland—Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, and 
Zug.7 The political opposition between the ecclesiastical prince and the city of 
Constance was clearly reflected in the religious decisions and the respective 
foreign alliances made at the time.
If Zurich and Bern had won the War of Kappel in 1531, Zwingli would have 
continued his missionary policy of establishing a large network of Reformed 
partners in Southern Germany. His defeat relegated the Swiss to their own 
territories: not only did Zurich, now weakened, have to curtail its expansion- 
ism, but the Catholic cantons also broke off their unnatural alliance with 
the Habsburgs after Ferdinand 1 neglected to help them during the war. The 
Peace of Kappel (.Zweiter Kappeler Landfrieden) stipulated that both the Prot- 
estants and the Catholics dismiss their recent confessional alliances, which 
were seen as contrary to the Confederates' past sworn treaties. This was par- 
ticularly hard for Zwinglian Constance, which until Kappel had aspired to full 
membership in the Confederation, or at least to the status of a Zugewandter 
Ort', the Catholic cantons now vetoed the promotion. By establishing, for the 
hrst time in history, the principle that would later be called cuius regio, eius 
religio, the Swiss resigned themselves to a Confederation that accommodated 
religious plurality, half-heartedly preferring this to a continuing war over true 
religion that could be decided only with help from foreign allies. In spite of 
the many crises that were to come, the confessional parties felt relatively se- 
cure in maintaining this shaky equilibrium. The Protestant cities of Zurich, 
Bern, Basel, and Schaffhausen, together with their allies in Glarus, Appenzell, 
and some Zugewandte, were economically strong, demographically superior,
7 Bettina Braun, Die Eidgenossen, das Reich und das politische System Karls v (Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1997), 3^-41.
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and militarily powerful. But they had lost in Kappel against the deeply 
committed Fitnf Orte—Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, and Zug—which 
could count on support from Fribourg, Solothurn, a part of Glarus and Ap- 
penzell, and important Zugewandte, especially the ecclesiastical princes; 
they could also hope for support from the powerful Catholic monarchs in the 
neighborhood.
The Peace of Kappel did not set aside religious strife, least of all in the man- 
dated territories {Gemeine Herrschaften) where dominion, the regio, belonged 
to lords of different faiths. But in spite of its initial provisional character, the 
second Peace of Kappel managed to politicize metaphysical questions by de- 
fining the status quo ante and guaranteeing clear border lines, by prohibit- 
ing religious slander and provocations, and by neutralizing conflict zones, in 
particular the bridgehead areas for alliances with German partners—Aargau, 
Thurgau, and St. Gallen. The mandated territories were administered alter- 
nately and thus most of the time by a bailiff from a Catholic canton. In the 
mandated territories, the Protestant subjects were free to keep their faith or to 
convert if they wanted, while the Catholics were no longer permitted to con- 
vert. This entangled coexistence could sometimes be very difhcult, particularly
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in Thurgau, where, for example, the two confessions sometimes had to share 
the single church of a village in a so-called simultaneum.8 The Toggenburg, 
Zwingli's native region, had to acknowledge again the abbot of St. Gallen as its 
overlord, though the valley was to a large extent Protestant. After Kappel, the 
rural subjects of Zurich complained about the losses and peacefully revolted in 
order to avoid suffering further as victims in religious wars. They also insisted 
that the councils not only keep the ministers away from political decisions but 
also that they distance themselves from the Swabians.9 The peasants did not 
want to have to pay the bloody price for a religious and foreign policy that 
served the political and religious needs of the city a second time.
16.5 The Missing Common Ground
In spite of its fragility, the new post-Reformation structure of the Confedera- 
tion, settled in 1531, was crucial for perpetuating an internal equilibrium and in 
keeping the country out of international conflicts until 1798. This was the case, 
however, only as regards the Confederation as a “state,” because hundreds of 
thousands of Swiss mercenaries fought on foreign battlehelds both in Europe 
and overseas. The Confederation as a whole, utterly divided in itself and lack- 
ing a common authority, was unable to practice foreign policy in an age where 
alliances followed confessional lines and where new military technologies— 
especially hrearms—and changed strategies asked for clear and unique mili- 
tary leadership. The Swiss cantons, which had already followed differing aims 
during the Italian Wars of the early 16th century, could never have agreed on a 
territorial direction for expansion or on a common partner.
The only eventual exception to this was France. The alliance of 1521 grant- 
ed the French king up to 16,000 Swiss mercenaries, and from 1530 onwards a 
French ambassador resided permanently in Solothurn and inhuenced Swiss 
politics through advice and pensions. Still, after Zwingli preached against the 
immoral mercenaries and “pensioners” (receiving bribes) who exported death
8 Frauke Volkland, Konfession und Selbstverstandnis. Reformierte Rituale in der gemischtkon- 
fessionetlen Kleinstadt Bischofszetl im i/. Jahrhundert (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2005); Randolph C. Head, “Shared Lordships, Authority, and Administration. The Exercise 
of Dominion in the Gemeine Herrschaften, 1417-1600,” Central European History 30 (1997), 
489-512; Randolph C. Head, “Fragmented Dominion, Fragmented Churches. The Institution- 
alization of the Landfrieden in the Thurgau, 1531-1610,” ARG 96 (2005), 117-44. For additional 
literature see Maissen, “Konfessionskulturen,” 231-2.
9 For the revolt, see Bachtold, Bullinger vor dem Rat, 15-29. See also Chapter 2 above, 91-2.
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to others and imported the subversive luxury of princes and noblemen to their 
own country, Zurich (in 1521) and Bern (in 1529) decided to abstain from the 
French alliance. Thus, the two most important Protestant cantons did not 
participate in the French alliance until 1564 (Bern) and 1614 (Zurich). By then 
France, and in particular Henry iv, had gained a reputation as a reliable arbiter 
in internal conflicts. Through the 16th century, the French sought to avoid any 
turmoil in Switzerland that would impede the recruitment of soldiers or open 
the neighboring flank to a hostile intervention from Austria. The French alli- 
ance was the only “institution,” besides the Confederal Diet, that eventually 
included all the cantons and thus gradually replaced the Holy Roman Empire 
as a constitutional framework. In the 16th century the Swiss no longer visited 
imperial Diets and slowly moved toward exemption from the imperial cham- 
ber court in Speyer, a privilege that was granted to them in 1648 as part of the 
Peace of Westphalia and was later interpreted as sovereignty.
It is important to remember that there was no constitutional contract unit- 
ing all the cantons. The Confederation was a network of alliances with specihc 
“eternal” pacts (Bundesbriefe) between some members, but it lacked a unitary 
structure. Until the Reformation, the regular ritual of delegates conhrming 
the pacts by oath every hfth year had been extremely important. The German 
name Eidgenossenschaft made clear that this was a commonwealth that relied 
on the shared oath (.Eid). And it was precisely this oath that became impossible 
after 1526, when Protestant Zurich refused to utter the reference to the saints 
that was part of the traditional formula. Furthermore, because Zurich was the 
presiding canton (Vorort) of the Confederation, according to the protocol it 
had to pronounce the oath before the others. If Zurich abstained from this duty 
the metaphysical basis for the Confederation was lost and, as there was no real 
institutional backing, this meant that little was left over of the Confederation 
itself. This explains why Basel, for example, fearing a Habsburg intervention, 
suggested a reiteration of the common oath in 1543, as did the French king 
Henry 11 when he tried to unite the cantons against Charles v in 1548—these 
attempts failed.10 The alienation was not limited to a symbolic level: the less 
the Confederates communicated with one another, the less they knew about 
each other and the higher was the risk of dangerous misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations of each other’s intentions.11
10 Hans-Ulrich Bachtold, ‘“Das uns gott helff und die heiligen’: Ziirich im Streit um die eid- 
genossische Schwurformel,” in Campi fs, 295-346.
11 Thomas Lau, “Der Konfessionskonflikt als Kommunikationsproblem—die AJte Eidgenos- 
senschaft zwischen 1531 und 1712,” in Karl Borromaus und die katholiscke Reform, (eds.) 
Mariano Delgado and Markus Ries (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2010), 28-40.
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Confessional differences created eternal debates at the Swiss Diet, not least 
over many practical questions.12 Any local conflict could potentially become 
an issue for the whole Confederation to hght over if it was brought into the 
dichotomies of religious controversy.13 Luckily for the continuation of the 
Confederation, however, confessional antagonism followed dividing lines 
other than the formerly constitutive difference between the urban and rural 
cantons. In 1481, after the so-called Sow-banner campaign (Saubannerzug), the 
Stanser Verkommnis had put only a provisional end to the conflicts character- 
ized by this predetermined breaking point. Zurich and Schwyz represented the 
two camps and were the main antagonists throughout the 15th century. It was 
no coincidence that they opposed each other again in the confessional age, 
but it was decisive that henceforth Lucerne, Solothurn, and Fribourg sided not 
with their fellow patricians in Bern and the other cities, but with Schwyz and 
the other rural cantons of central Switzerland to form a league of burghers and 
countrymen. Likewise, Zurich found its religious allies among the peasants 
of Glarus, Appenzell (to become Appenzell-AuBerrhoden), the Toggenburg, 
and the Grisons. These religious ties were strong, but they did not completely 
cover the structural and political differences between urban and rural cantons 
within both camps. Further heterogeneity stemmed from traditional rivalries, 
like the one between Zurich and Bern, which were exacerbated by theological 
differences, especially in the 1540s.
16.6 Shared Interests and Joint Enterprises
On the other hand, many cantons shared interests that transcended their re- 
ligious differences, such as the control of epidemics or the trade of grain, salt, 
and mercenaries with neighboring states and major powers. The existence and 
survival of the Confederation depended on the cantons’ commonalities, if they 
wanted to continue their defensive alliance of petty republics located between 
the mighty princes of Austria, Milan, and France and in order to act as a col- 
lective lord over the territories they had conquered together. The mandated 
territories thus formed a syndicate, particularly between the small Catholic
12 Andreas Wiirgler, Die Tagsatzung der EicLgenossen. Politik, Kommunikation und Symbolik 
einer reprdsentativen Institution im europaischen Kontext 1470-7798 (Epfendorf: Biblioteca 
academica, 2013).
13 Ulrich Pfister, “Konfessionskonflikte in der friihneuzeitlichen Schweiz. Eine struktural- 
istische Interpretation,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Religions- und Kulturgeschichte iox 
(2007), 257-312.
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cantons and Zurich. The former depended on and prohted most from revenues 
and offices, whereas Zurich was closely interconnected with the surrounding 
mandated territories in the Aargau (Baden, the FreieAmter), Sargans, the lower 
Rheintal, and the Thurgau.
In general, and in spite of their differing beliefs, urban, rural, and even 
princely authorities faced similar challenges and threats as lords of unprivi- 
leged subjects. The often fragmented and intersected territories made arrange- 
ments between the different cantons unavoidable: for example, who could 
share jurisdictional rights? Peaceful solutions, prepared by negotiations and 
tedious bargaining, compromise, and even compliance, were usually the bet- 
ter option for maintaining stability than the intervention of dangerous foreign 
powers.14 Therefore, Basel was not the only Confederate that relied on the 
arbitration of its fellow Confederates and aimed at “good correspondence” in its 
relations with a Catholic neighbor, in this case the prince-bishop residing in 
Porrentruy (Pruntrut), who in tum depended economically and hnancially 
on the free city. Even when there was an opportunity to encourage Reforma- 
tion after the bishop’s death in 1553, Basel did not attempt it. For his part, the 
prince-bishop generally tolerated the Reformed subjects who lived in the 
southern region of his territories, and although he once threatened to change 
this policy in 1579, the Reformed cantons were successful in deterring him from 
taking this step.15
Bern proved the continuity of strategic commonalities in the most obvi- 
ous way during the campaign against Savoy that it led with its traditional ally 
Fribourg in the 1530s.16 The drive westward had led to an alliance between the 
two towns in the 15th century, especially during the Burgundian Wars, when 
they conquered territories that they then mled jointly. While still engaged in 
the Italian Wars, the Confederates temporarily, from 1512 to 1529, occupied the 
county of Neuchatel and administered it through bailiffs. Thanks to this situ- 
ation, Bern began a policy of reforming francophone territories by supporting 
Guillaume Farel from the Dauphine, a follower of Zwingli and Bucer who won
14 See Daniela Hacke, “Zwischen Konflikt und Konsens. Zur politischen konfessionellen 
Kultur in der Alten Eidgenossenschaft des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts,” Zeitschriftfur Histo- 
rische Forschung 32 (2005), 575-604; on the culture of conflict, see also Andreas Wurgler, 
“Aushandeln statt Prozessieren. Zur Konfliktkultur der alten Eidgenossenschaft im Ver- 
gleich mit Frankreich und dem Deutschen Reich (1500-1800),” Traverse (2001/3), 25-38, 
and Thomas Maissen, “Disputatio de Helvetiis an natura consentiant. Fruhneuzeitliche 
Annaherungen an die Schweizer Konsensbereitschaft,” Traverse (2001/3), 39_55-
15 Hans Berner, “Die gute Correspondenz." Die Politik der Stadt Basel gegeniiber dem Fiirst- 
Bistum Basel 1525-85 (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1989), 97-102.
16 See also Chapters 3 and 9 above.
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Neuchatel over to the Protestant side in 1530. A printing press was installed 
shortly thereafter that enabled the first francophone Protestants to spread 
their written message in French, something that would have been impossible 
in France. Farel also preached in Biel and in the adjacent southem, franco- 
phone territories of the prince-bishop of Basel, which, under the protection of 
Bern, partly passed over to the new faith. Farel then went on to the Vaud, which 
belonged to the duke of Savoy but had already come under Bem’s influence; 
he was joined there by a native son of the area, Pierre Viret. They both went 
on to proselytize in Geneva, an episcopal town that aspired to the status of an 
imperial city but lay isolated within the territories of the duke of Savoy, who 
installed a member of his family as the bishop of Geneva. In 1533 the burghers 
of Geneva finally expelled the bishop.
In the subsequent conflict, Geneva’s search for independence from its over- 
lord and from Savoy and the growing influence of Protestant preachers met 
with the expansionist tendencies of the alliance between Protestant Bern and 
Catholic Fribourg. Since 1526 a combourgeoisie had united them with Geneva, 
and in 1530 the two cantons occupied Geneva in order to protect it from the ag- 
gressions of the Savoyard nobility. In 1536 they not only backed the city against 
the duke, but also conquered the Savoyard Vaud and the prince-bishopric of 
Lausanne without meeting with much resistance. After a disputation in Lau- 
sanne, these territories soon passed over to the Protestant faith. Furthermore, 
Bern occupied the Pays de Gex around Geneva and the Western Chablais to the 
south of Lake Geneva, while its other Catholic allies, the Valaisans, advanced to 
occupy the eastern part of the Chablais. After Bern had weakened its long-time 
antagonist in this area, the French king Francis 1 completed the duke’s defeat 
and occupied almost all of the remaining Savoy.
16.7 The Reformed Closing of Ranks between Zurich and Geneva
Bern aspired to incorporate Geneva into its own territory as it had done with 
the other former episcopal see, Lausanne. However, the Genevans did not 
wish to exchange the frying pan for the fire; instead they opted to inherit the 
bishop’s overlordship and thus win their independence. This would become 
decisive for the further development both of the Reformed Confession and 
the Confederation when Farel invited Jean Calvin to Geneva. Calvin stayed 
there from 1536 to 1538 and definitely established himself in 1541. In the long 
mn, his preaching formed the basis for the emancipation of the Welsche who 
spoke Romance languages. The Grofie Pund obertiitscherLanden was decidedly 
German-speaking, as the elites of Fribourg had abandoned the French language
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when they joined the Confederation. The Italian speakers in the Ticino were the 
cantons’ subjects, just as those in the Valtellina were in the Grisons. Likewise, in 
the allied Valais the German-speaking easternpart of the valley had equally sub- 
dued the lower, westem part that was francophone. Neuchatel would eventu- 
ally become a princely ally of its own but, as previously mentioned, it remained 
occupied by the Confederates until 1529. Likewise, the Vaud, a former subject of 
Savoy, was now the subject of Bem. Although it lacked a territory, tiny Geneva 
was a notable exception among these French-speaking dominions. It soon made 
up for its lack of territory through the international reputation earned by Calvin 
and the academy that was founded in 1559, which attracted some thousand inter- 
national students in the following century.17 Although Geneva could deal almost 
parl passu with Bem, the biggest and most powerful republic north of the Alps, 
the original Genevan elites paid a considerable price for this privilege. Many of 
them opposed Calvin and were later forced to emigrate, and some were even 
put to death. They were replaced by well-trained and skilled Calvinists, who ac- 
quired Genevan citizenship after fleeing from France, Italy, and the Netherlands.
Jean Calvin was bom in 1509 in the Picardy and had little in common with 
the Toggenburger Zwingli who was 25 years his senior and already dead by the 
time Calvin was introduced to Protestantism. Unlike the Zurichers, Calvin had 
no animosity towards Luther, whose theological insights he largely shared, and 
he collaborated closely with Melanchthon. On the other hand, Calvin regu- 
larly contested the political authorities of Bem and their state-church Zwing- 
lianism. His presbyterial model of church discipline organized in the parish 
was distinctly different from Zwingli’s. On theological grounds, the doctrine of 
double predestination also caused disputes.18 The area of the Vaud was a par- 
ticular battleground for the different ecclesiological and theological concepts 
of Zwinglianism and Calvinism.
17 There is an abundance of literature on the intemational influence of Calvinism. An on- 
going bibliography is published annually in the Catvin Theotogicat Joumat. For a recent 
recapitulation see Ansgar Reiss and Sabine Witt, (eds.), Catvinismus. Die Reformierten in 
Deutschland und Europa. Eine Ausstetlung des Deutschen Historischen Museums Berlin 
und der Johannes a Lasco Bibliothek Enden (?. April bis ig. Juti 2009) (Dresden: Sandstein, 
2009); Heinz Schilling, “Calvin und Calvinismus in europageschichtlicher Perspektive,” in 
Catvin und Reformiertentum in Ungam und Siebenbiirgen. Helvetisches Bekenntnis, Ethnie 
undPolitikvom iG. Jahrhundert bis 1918, (eds.) Marta Fata and Anton Schindling (Miinster: 
Aschendorff, 2010): 1-21.
18 Guggisberg, Bem kg, 55-242; Emidio Campi, “Calvin, the Swiss Reformed Churches, and 
the European Reformation,” in Catvin and His Influence, 1509-2009, (eds.) Irena Backus 
and Philipp Benedict (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011), 119-43, here at 119-21; see 
also Chapter 9 above.
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The political turnaround of 1547/48 in Germany was decisive for bringing 
Calvin and Geneva closer to the Swiss German Reformation.19 In 1547, Charles 
v defeated the Schmalkaldic League of the Lutherans. Its prominent members 
were, besides princes like the two leaders John Frederick 1 of Saxony and Philip 
1 of Hesse, the imperial cities of the southwest, from Strasbourg to Augsburg 
and from Lindau to Ulm. The victorious emperor forced new, conservative 
constitutions onto these towns. He ordered a religious decree, the Augsburg 
Interim, which imposed traditional Catholic beliefs and practices with two ex- 
ceptions: priests did not need to be celibate and the flock could receive both 
the bread and wine in the Lord’s Supper. While most territories and cities sub- 
mitted to the Interim, Constance did not. Ambrosius Blarer and the council 
hoped that their Zwinglian associates would help them against the emperor. 
But when Charles v besieged the city and conquered it in 1548, the Protestant 
Swiss bowed to the herce opposition of Lucerne and abstained from interven- 
ing. The Catholics wanted to avoid entanglement in the German conflict and 
in any ensuing civil war. They feared that the Reformed cantons, as imperial 
cities, would reintegrate into the Holy Roman Empire if they lost the war, and 
if they won that the Catholics would ask the emperor to intervene. Whatever 
happened, the Confederates would lose and the Habsburgs would win.20 Still, 
not just the Protestants, particularly in Bem, but also some Catholic politicians 
like Aegidius Tschudi from Glams warned that Constance, situated on the left 
bank of the Rhine, might become a Habsburg bridgehead to Swiss territory. 
Indeed, Constance lost its status as an imperial city and was reduced to an 
Austrian mediate town and re-catholicized. The Zwinglian ministers who had 
been preaching in cities such as Strasbourg, Ulm, and Augsburg had to follow 
Constance’s Ambrosius Blarer and beat a retreat to Switzerland. They were not 
even reinstalled when German Protestants freed themselves from the Interim 
after 1552. Southern Germany now dehnitely and solidly became Lutheran, 
and the Rhine emerged as a religious borderline between the two evangelical 
traditions.
Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli’s very well-informed successor as church leader 
(.Antistes) of Zurich, observed the dangerous developments of 1547/48 very 
closely. Charles’s momentary triumph menaced the Reformed movement as 
much as it threatened the Confederation itself—the Thurgau hinterland of 
Constance was just one of many former Habsburg territories in Switzerland
19 Thomas Maissen, “Die Eidgenossen und das Augsburger Interim. Zu einem unbekannten 
Gutachten Heinrich Bullingers,” in Das Interim 7548/50. Herrschaftskrise utid Glaubenskon- 
flikt, (ed.) Luise Schom-Schiitte (Gutersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus, 2005), 76-104.
20 Lau, Der Konfessionskonflikt, 30.
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that the Habsburg emperor might attempt to reclaim. A renewed Duchy of 
Swabia seemed a possibility that could reach far south of Lake Constance un- 
der a Habsburg prince. For this reason the Catholic cantons, even though they 
refused to countenance help for Zwinglian Constance, made it clear that they 
would respect the auxiliary promises of the old treaties and defend their lib- 
erty together with the Confederates of the other faith.
The crisis of 1547/48 not only strengthened the shattered ties among the 
Confederates but also created new ones between Zurich and Geneva. Bullinger 
and Calvin were both severe critics of the Interim and of those Lutherans, like 
Melanchthon, whom they suspected of giving in to imperial pressure. Calvin 
came to Zurich with Farel on Whitsun in 1548 and discovered that Bullinger’s 
ideas of the Lord’s Supper did not conflict with his own conviction. In 1549 
the three Reformers signed the Consensus Tigurinus, which settled their differ- 
ences concerning the Lord’s Supper.21 Eventually, after the Synod of Dordrecht 
(1618/19), this would become the basis for the union of the Reformed on a uni- 
versal level, but for the moment it mattered most in the context of the Con- 
federation. It is particularly signihcant that not only Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, 
Neuchatel, the Grisons, and Mulhouse accepted the Consensus but also, in 1551, 
the Bernese, although they felt offended by being out-maneuvered and went 
on in various quarrels with Calvin over different issues.22
Johannes Haller and Wolfgang Musculus were two ministers in Bern who 
played a decisive role in this closer union of the Reformed.23 They had both 
been pastors in Augsburg until they had to flee the emperor and the Interim 
and thus were convinced followers of the Zwinglian model. Haller contributed 
signihcantly to the fall of Simon Sulzer, the pastor of Bern’s Minster, who had 
successfully beaten his Zwinglian opponent Kaspar Megander back to Zurich 
in 1538 before trying to bring Bern's church closer to Luther and especially to 
Bucer. However, Sulzer was deposed and had to leave the city too; he went 
to Basel in 1548 where he became Antistes hve years later24 Thus, it came as
21 Cons Tig; Gordon, Calvin, 179-80 and 204-9; Chapter 2 above.
22 See Chapter 9 above.
23 Rudolf Dellsperger, Rudolf Freudenberger, and Wolfgang Weber, (eds.), Wotfgang Mus- 
culus (1497-1563) und die oberdeutsche Reformation (Berbn: Akademischer Verlag, 1997), 
281-98; Reinhard Bodenmann, Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563). Destin d’un autodidacte 
Lorrain au siecle des Reformes (Geneva: Droz, 2000); see also Chapter 3 above.
24 For Sulzer, see Amy Nelson Bumett, “Bucers letzter Jiinger. Simon Sulzer und Basels 
konfessionelle Einheit,” bzga 107 (2007), 137-72; Bumett, Teaching the Reformation, and 
Chapter 4 above; on “Lutheranizing Basel,” see also the seminal work by Hans Rudolf Gug- 
gisberg, Basel in the Sixteenth Century: Aspects of the City Republic before, during, and after 
the Reformation (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982).
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no surprise that Sulzer’s Basel refused to join the Consensus Tigurinus and 
distanced itself from the Zwinglians, as it did from Calvin after he clashed 
with the Erasmian religious refugees in Basel, notably Sebastian Castellio and 
Celio Secondo Curione. Thanks to the university and the printing press, which 
remained among the most important in Europe until the 1580s, Basel was an 
intellectual center in its own right and was heavily influenced by the humanist 
tradition, which invited the study of secular and divine texts less for the sake 
of doctrinal truth than for moral learning and erudition. It was symptomatic 
that Basel kept its distance from Zurich and Bern when it joined the mercenary 
league, which eleven cantons and many of their allies renewed with France in 
June 1549, almost simultaneously to the Consensus.
In fact, this treaty with Henry 11 was an alternative strategy used as protec- 
tion against the overwhelming influence of Charles v. Ever since his triumph 
over the Schmalkaldic League the emperor had threatened the equilibrium 
of Europe and particularly of Basel, which lay partly on the right side of the 
Rhine and had joined the Confederation only after the reforms of the imperial 
Diet of 1495, and was therefore still included in the imperial registry. The result 
was that Charles ordered Basel to implement the Interim. This threat passed 
when the Lutheran princes, together with Henry 11, drove the emperor out of 
Germany in 1552. Basel remained in the “Lutheran” camp until 1585, when Sul- 
zer died and the orthodox Calvinist Johann Jacob Grynaeus succeeded him as 
Antistes. Basel approached Zurich and Bern also because in 1585 Confederate 
arbitration forced the city to compensate the prince-bishop with a high sum 
for the rights he had ceded during the Reformation.
The theological closing of ranks between Zurich and Geneva and its reper- 
cussions for the Confederation prefigured the political and geographical struc- 
ture of present-day Switzerland extending from and limited by the lakes of 
Constance and Geneva, and thus including a considerable francophone area. 
Catholic princes in Austria, Milan, Savoy, and France surrounded the country 
and became increasingly hostile to the Reformed, as did the Lutherans who 
now dominated the Protestant areas in Southern Germany. They felt reassured 
by the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which included the Lutherans but excluded 
the followers of Zwingli and Calvin in the Holy Roman Empire. The Swiss Re- 
formed cantons became a refuge for their fellow believers, albeit often rath- 
er reluctantly. The case of Geneva had taught them that immigration could 
lead to the demise of the traditional elite. The expulsion of the Protestants 
of Locarno in 1555 had already posed serious problems for the Zurichers and 
Baslers, whose guilds were not disposed to share commercial activities with 
the arriving Muralto and Orelli families. Thus the Protestants were prone to ob- 
serve the Peace of Kappel and the cuius regio rather than to provoke conflicts
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that could harm their immediate interests. Instead of welcoming immigrants, 
they preferred to support financially the established Reformed parishes in the 
German-speaking mandated territories as well as their brethren in faith when 
they were persecuted abroad in Italy, France, England, Hungary, and Poland. 
Although Calvin and Bullinger may have felt equally sympathetic toward the 
persecuted, Geneva was far more hospitable to newcomers than Zurich. This 
was partly due to the fact that the guilds were rather weak in Geneva. Unlike 
the German urban reformation movement, the Genevan church was relatively 
free from state control, and it had a universal rather than parochial vision of its 
mission. Still, there were other routes that brought foreigners to Switzerland: 
the University of Basel attracted scholars from all over Europe, and the Valtel- 
lina and the Italian speaking valleys in the Grisons were the first destination 
for many Protestants fleeing ffom Italy.25
To cope with their manifest isolation after 1555, the Reformed reached out 
for religious allies all over Europe.26 Bullinger left behind 12,000 letters that 
present him as the center of a vast transnational web made up of about a 
thousand correspondents. He kept up-to-date contacts with Philipp of Hesse, 
the champion of Protestant unionism, and sent him both the Consensus Tig- 
urinus and the Second Helvetic Confession (Confessio Helvetica Posterior).27 
The Second Helvetic Confession was a result of close ties with the Palatine 
elector Frederick 111 who started to draw the Palatinate into the Reformed 
camp in the early 1560s. For the Heidelberg Catechism of 1563 the elector re- 
lied on experts with Melanchthonian, Calvinist, and Zwinglian backgrounds. 
After imposing the Heidelberg Catechism on his own subjects, Frederick 111 
had Bullinger’s Latin manuscript translated into German and printed in 1566. 
Thomas Erastus from Baden belonged to the Zwinglians at the Palatine court. 
As a champion of the state church, he eventually had to surrender to the Cal- 
vinists in the matter of church discipline. Similarly, the Dutch eventually pre- 
ferred the Genevan model of ecclesiastic autonomy to Zurich’s state church. 
Nevertheless, Bullinger remained in close contact with politicians and schol- 
ars of the Palatinate and the Netherlands 28 And Johann Jacob Grynaeus, who 
became the orthodox Antistes of Basel in 1585, was not the only conspicuous 
Reformed to study or teach at Heidelberg University before continuing his 
career in Switzerland.
25 Bundi, Fliichtlingsschicksale; see Chapters 7 and 8 above.
26 See also Locher, Zwinglische Reformation.
27 Text in RBS 2/2,243-345. Andreas Miihling, Heinrich Bullingers europdische Kirchenpolitik 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 2001), 74-96.
28 Muhling, Kirchenpolitik, 104-31.
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Besides the Reformed territories in the Holy Roman Empire, the Zwinglians 
retained close ties with sympathizers in France and, more notably, in Scotland 
and England where Simon Grynaeus from Basel had already formed a friend- 
ship with Thomas Cranmer. Marian exiles, notably Peter Martyr Vermigli, fled 
from the island to Switzerland in the 1550s. In addition, several influential 
works, especially by Bullinger, were translated into English.29 The Reformed in 
Hungary initially took their inspiration less from Calvin than from Bullinger’s 
Second Helvetic Confession, which they adopted at the Synod of Debrecen in 
1567, as did the Reformed in Poland after reformulating it and calling it the 
Confessio Sendomiriensis.30 Except for Lutheranizing Basel, which adopted the 
Second Helvetic Confession only in 1644, the Swiss Reformed all joined, includ- 
ing Mulhouse and Geneva; abroad, besides the Hungarians and the Poles, the 
Scottish Kirk and the French Huguenots also adopted it.
16.8 The Catholic Reaction
Whereas the “Reformed Intemational,” in spite of lasting doctrinal differences 
between Zwinglians and Calvinists especially concerning double predestina- 
tion, developed a common dogmatic basis and thus closed its ranks, the Swiss 
Reformed did not establish military alliances with their fellow Protestants. In 
addition to geographical distance, this was also due to the Zwinglian rejection 
of foreign mercenary service and to the relatively unthreatened position of the 
large Reformed cities within the Confederation. This began to change when 
the Catholic cantons engaged with the Counter-Reformation after the end of 
the Council of Trent in 1563, which had already provided a theological and in- 
tellectual catalyst for the Second Helvetic Confession. Although they hesitated 
for a long time, the Catholic cantons sent not only a theological representative, 
Joachim Eichhorn, the Abbot of Einsiedeln, to the last period but also a leading 
politician, Melchior Lussi of Nidwalden. Lussi was also a friend of Carlo Borro- 
meo, the archbishop of Milan, and invited him to impose Tridentine reforms in 
the Catholic cantons. These cantons had at first been reluctant to adopt such 
reforms for fear of alienating their French patron, since the Gallican concili- 
arists opposed papalism and the publication of the decrees of Trent.31 In 1586,
29 Miihling, Kirckenpoiitik, 149-85; Gordon, Swiss Reformation, 299-304; see also Torrance 
Kirby, The Zurich Connection and Tudor Political Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
30 See Tamas Juhasz, “‘Mirabilis est cursus verbi Dei!’ Die Entwicklung des Helvetischen 
Bekenntnisses in Ungam und Siebenbiirgen,” in Fata and Schindling, Calvin und Reformi- 
ertentum, 63-78.
31 See Delgado and Ries, KarlBorromaus.
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Pope Sixtus v established a permanent nunciature in Lucerne, which subse- 
quently became the institutional center of the Catholic reform in Switzerland. 
The Jesuits established a college there in 1578, and several cantons invited 
mostly foreign—that is, Italian—Capuchins to assume charge of pastoral care 
and reform the clergy; due to different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, 
this situation often created problems. The Collegium Helveticum was set up in 
Milan, offering university places for future Swiss priests who gradually caught 
up with the scholarly advantage achieved by the Protestants. In the same year, 
1586, the Catholic cantons formed the “Golden League,” also called the “Borro- 
mean League” after its spiritual father. Ayear later, they (without Solothum) en- 
tered into an alliance with Philip 11 of Spain, the leading power of the Counter- 
Reformation. An ordinary ambassador represented him in Lucerne.
This close cooperation was not as obvious as it may seem at hrst glance. 
In 1559/60 the aforementioned Catholic politician and renowned historian 
Aegidius Tschudi almost provoked a war in his home canton of Glams. The 
Catholic cantons, always afraid of being surrounded and destroyed by their 
Protestant neighbors, were ready to intervene in order to repress the Protes- 
tant majority in Glams and to establish Catholic mle in the confessionally di- 
vided canton where—similar to the Three Leagues—the communities were 
almost autonomous in choosing their religion. The Catholics expected support 
from the pope and from Spain, which had just secured its predominance in 
Europe through the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis with France. However, Spain 
had gone bankmpt in 1557 and was not willing to risk another costly war that 
would put the exposed Spanish territory of the Franche-Comte in jeopardy. 
The Swiss, both Catholics and Protestants, officially vouched for the neutrality 
of the province, and in the case of a conflict between the two religious parties, 
there was the risk that Bem could invade the Franche-Comte.32
In the second half of the 16th century the general situation changed. Span- 
ish foreign policy became increasingly ideological in a salvihc war against the 
heretics in England and the defecting Netherlands. France was no longer a 
rival, as it was being torn apart by religious wars that endangered the exis- 
tence of the Huguenot co-religionists of the Swiss Calvinists. This was made 
especially clear in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre of 1572 that shocked
32 Rudolf Bolzem, “Der ‘Tschudikrieg’ im Spannungsfeld der auslandischen Machte, mit 
besonderer Beriicksichtigung Spaniens,” in AegicLius Tschudi und seine Zeit, (eds.) Katha- 
rina Koller-Weiss and Christian Sieber (Basel: Krebs, 2002), 315-35; Markus Rene Wick, 
“Der ‘Glamerhandel.’ Strukturgeschichtliche und konfliktsoziologische Hypothesen zum 
Glarner Konfessionsgegensatz,” in Jahrbuch des Historischen Vereins des Kantons Glarus 
69 (Glams: 1982), 47-240.
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Protestant Europe. The Reformed Confederates despaired of their former trust 
in the Valois dynasty, which sometimes used its Swiss mercenaries to eradi- 
cate Calvinist heresy. In the Catholic cantons, former Swiss exponents of the 
French alliance, such as Ludwig Pfyffer von Altishoffen ffom Lucerne, nick- 
named “king of the Swiss,” abandoned the maneuvering French king for the 
opposing Catholic League and its supporter Philipp n, who seemed to be the 
only reliable defender of the faith. What interested Spain most in this situa- 
tion, besides the protection of its possessions in the Franche-Comte and Mi- 
lan, was the camino de suizos, the transit routes that enabled Spanish troops to 
pass from Milan over the Gotthard Pass to the Rhine and onwards to Flanders 
to fight the Dutch. This was the alternative route to the camino espanoL, which 
passed further west through the Duchy of Savoy, a long-time Spanish ally, and 
continued through the Franche-Comte.
This connection involved Switzerland in international affairs for different 
reasons: Swiss Catholics sympathized with Spain, and Protestant cantons fa- 
vored the Dutch, the majority of whom were Reformed. Together Bern, Fribourg, 
and France had occupied most of the Duchy of Savoy in 1536, but in 1559, at the 
Peace of Cateau-Cambresis, Henry 11 was forced to return his spoils. Under in- 
creasingpressure, Bern and its allies restituted conquests south of Lake Geneva 
and around Calvin’s city in the 1560s, thus reestablishing the passage along the 
camino espanoL Geneva itself remained a thorn in the side of the duke of Savoy, 
both for political and religious reasons. This was well known to Bem, which had 
signed an aLliance perpetueUe with Geneva in 1558 whereby both cities pledged 
to protect each other. By reentering the French alliance in 1564, Bern was fol- 
lowing the same rationale of securing its flank against Savoy, which had built a 
league with the Catholic cantons (without Fribourg) in 1560 and renewed it in 
1577 and 1581. Around the same time, 1579/80, the Catholic cantons also formed 
a close alliance with another long-term partner, the prince-bishop of Basel.
Unlike Constance, however, with its similar strategic and religious impor- 
tance, Geneva was not conquered by a regional dynastic power. In 1579, Bern 
brought France and Catholic Solothurn together in an alliance to protect 
Geneva from Savoy. In 1584, Zurich also engaged in a formal combourgeoisie 
with Geneva, and in 1588 it signed, again with Bern, a defensive alliance for Stras- 
bourg. In 1589/90, Bern and Geneva fought a war in Upper Savoy against Duke 
Charles Emmanuel 1. Hence the importance of the opposing alliance that the 
Catholic cantons (without the Francophile Solothurn) formed with Spain ^1587: 
mighty Bern was now surrounded by potential enemies who had pledged to help 
each other in case one of them was attacked. Furthermore, they granted each 
other the right of transit and economic privileges. On the other side, already un- 
der Henry iii, France started to turn away from its Counter-Reformation policy.
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After Henry ni was assassinated in 1589, the Huguenot king Henry iv op- 
posed the Spanish party in France more than ever, ended the civil war in the 
realm, and, after his conversion to Catholicism, continued to support Protes- 
tants abroad. Unlike Spain, France was willing and able to pay the pensions it 
had promised, thus winning back many allies, even among the Catholic Swiss. 
Henry iv also won the war against the duke of Savoy who, after the failed “esca- 
lade” of 1602, had to accept Geneva’s independence in the treaty of Saint-Julien 
in 1603.33
16.9 National Identity in a Time of Crisis
The struggle for Geneva formed the background for an ongoing Swiss propa- 
ganda battle in the 1570s and 80s, which was waged through pamphlets, theatre 
plays, and etchings like those by Christoph Murer from Zurich who engraved 
mythical scenes of Wilhelm Tell and Nicholas of Fliie (1417-1487). These histor- 
ical references were symptomatic of a central and highly controversial ques- 
tion: Which party represented the real tradition of Switzerland and what did 
it consist of exactly? Nicholas of Fliie was a crucial ftgure in that regard: the
figure 16.2 Portion of an iUustrated broadsheet by Christoph Murer showing WiiheLm TeLL 
shooting the apple from his son’s head, 1580 
PHOTO COURTESY OF THE ZZB
33 See Chapter 9 above.
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Protestants saw him as a peacemaker who warned of discord and foreign— 
Spanish and Jesuit—interference in Swiss affairs; the Catholics laid claim to 
the pious pre-reformation hermit who would be beatihed in 1649 (veneration 
in his place of origin, Sachseln) and in 1671 (veneration in all of Switzerland); 
canonization followed in 1947.34 35
This clash over ancestors was a decisive turn away from the first generation 
of the Reformation, especially Vadian in St. Gallen and Bullinger, Johannes 
Stumpf, and Josias Simler in Zurich, who had closely cooperated with the prom- 
inent Catholic Aegidius Tschudi in historiographical projects that emphasized 
common ground and origins beyond confessional strife. The historical com- 
monalities went back, allegedly, to Helvetian ancestors. The ethnic continuity 
was localized in the qualities of an alpine nation—an “Alpenvolk.” Stumpfs.De- 
scription ofthe Deeds Worthy ofChronicling ofthe Common Praiseworthy Confed- 
eration of Cities, Lands andPeoples,35 an impressive folio printed in 1548 contain- 
ing high quality maps, was the most conspicuous result of this collaboration, 
although Tschudi’s research and theses about the foundation of the Confedera- 
tion would eventually have an even larger impact in the 18th century, when the 
first printed edition of his Chronicon Helveticum became the source for Friedrich 
Schiller’s Wilhelm Teil. This interdenominational cooperation ended as soon 
as the aforementioned historians died in the 1570s.36 The little that remained 
of Swiss historiography unambiguously sided with one religious party, like the 
works of Frank Guillimann from Fribourg, a follower of Spain who emigrated to 
become a university professor in the Habsburg city of Freiburg im Breisgau.
The lasting tension and the conflicting orientation in foreign policy 
ended by establishing clear religious frontiers in Switzerland, including the Zu- 
gewandte, and connected the parties to the international networks that had 
emerged before the Thirty Years’ War. France remained the only broker with 
access to both sides. The convert Henry iv had remained a reliable partner 
of the Protestant cantons who contributed many mercenaries to his armies, 
even from Zurich—albeit unofficially. In 1602 all cantons entered the renewed 
French alliance except for Zurich; this was a last obeisance to the city’s min- 
isters who defended the Zwinglian doctrine on mercenary service. However, 
Zurich sympathized with the French alliance and allowed volunteers ffom its 
territory to join Henry’s iv troops. In 1614, Zurich finally also entered into this 
fundamental treaty and broke with an almost centenarian tradition—without
34 See Chapter 1 above.
35 Gemeiner loblicher Eydgnoschaft Stetten, Landen und Volckeren chronickwirdiger thaaten 
beschreybung (Zurich: Froschauer, 1548).
36 Moser, Dignitat, 1:308-11.
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figure 16.3 “The old andnewprophet of SwitzerLand,”an ULustratedpoliticalpoem ca. 1607
showing the Confederate cantons, their alLies, andforeign powers, Drawing on 
parchment paper
PHOTO COURTESY OF ZZB, GRAPHISCHE SAMMLUNG
consulting the ministers or subjects, as had been done in preceding cases. This 
conversion was the result of an intemational situation wherein the Habsburg 
states, which encircled the Confederation almost completely, seemed to in- 
creasingly take the lead in an international Counter-Reformation offensive 
that only France could inhibit by military means. It also seemed appropriate 
to manifest a common foreign policy for the Confederation during dangerous 
times, at least through the French alliance that was also welcome because it 
promised guerdon and pensions.37
37 Christian Moser and Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Der Lange Schatten ZwingLis. Ziirich, das fran- 
zdsische SoLdbiindnis und eidgendssische Biindnispolitik, 1500-1650 (Ziirich: nzz Verlag, 
2009), 72-7.
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16.10 Intemational Networks before the Thirty Years' War
In 1612 and 1615, Zurich and Bern entered into further military alliances, first 
with the neighboring Margraviate of Baden-Durlach and then with Venice. 
While the former was a Lutheran territory and member of the Protestant 
Union that since 1609 had opposed the Catholic League, Venice was Catholic. 
Still, it was the fiercest opponent of Spanish domination in Italy and an impor- 
tant member in the chain of Habsburg enemies that stretched from England 
and the Netherlands over the Palatinate and Reformed territories in the Holy 
Roman Empire and Switzerland down to the Adriatic Sea. It remained so even 
after the assassination of Henry iv, who had been the mastermind of this infor- 
mal alliance. Zurich and Bern’s treaty with Venice granted mutual aid in times 
of crisis and reciprocal commercial privileges.
Using the same rationale, Venice had already formed an alliance with the 
Three Leagues in 1603 that was intended not only to profit their merchants and 
soldiers but also to block the passes linking the Habsburg territories of Milan 
and Tyrol. However, in 1613 a majority of the communes rejected a renewal 
of the alliance, not least due to political pressure from Spain on the Catho- 
lic Graubundners. A similar process split Appenzell in 1597. A year earlier, the 
Catholic communes of what would become Appenzell Innerrhoden adhered 
to the Spanish alliance of 1587 without considering the opposition of the Prot- 
estant communes who then formed a half-canton of their own, Appenzell 
Aufierrhoden.38 Arbiters from six cantons, half Protestant, half Catholic, mod- 
erated a surprisingly peaceful separation. These overpopulated alpine areas 
depended heavily on mercenary service and pensions, which also explains the 
“communalization” of foreign policy and the corresponding intensification of 
confessional identities.
Glarus later chose a similar path to Appenzell, after the Reformed majority 
imposed an alliance with Zurich and the predominantly Protestant League of 
the Ten Jurisdictions, one of Graubiinden’s Three Leagues. In 1623 the com- 
munes had the power to decide individually which camp they wanted to 
choose in mercenary business. This was part of an arrangement that clearly 
defined which offices were at the disposal of the Protestants and which ones 
were at the disposal of the Catholics. Thus Glarus, without openly splitting like 
Appenzell, became de facto a canton with two largely independent political 
entities.
38 Peter Blickle, “Verfassung und Religion. Voraussetzungen und Folgen der Landesteilung 
des Appenzell 1597,” Zeitschrift jur Rechtsgeschlchte, Germanistische Abteilung n5 (1998), 
339-6o.
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The strong position of the communes in these alpine areas led to a religious 
plurality that depended on communal choice, but it also allowed these val- 
leys to cohabitate without civil wars. The only exception to this was the Three 
Leagues, which became heavily involved in the Thirty Years’ War after the re- 
volt in the Catholic Valtellina in 1620, itself a reaction to Protestant repression 
culminating in the torture and murder of arch-priest Nicolo Rusca from Son- 
drio in 1618.39 But the subsequent series of conflicts can more easily be ex- 
plained by the strategic value that Graubiinden’s valleys and passes had for the 
Habsburgs, who sent their troops from Milan to Austria and Bohemia. France 
wanted to interrupt this supply, and thus the main antagonists of the spread- 
ing European war fought their battles in Graubiinden with the help of many 
local politicians and military entrepreneurs.40
The other alpine confederation, the Valais, regained confessional—that is, 
Catholic—uniformity in the early 17th century. In 1600 the Zenden formed 
an alliance with the overwhelmingly Reformed Graubiinden, despite oppo- 
sition ffom both the bishop of Sion and the allied Catholic cantons. The 
pact was manifestly directed against Spain. Many influential Catholics in 
the Valais tolerated and even backed the Protestants, who were particu- 
larly strong among the patricians in Sion and Leuk and had the support 
of neighboring Bern. They were united in their opposition to the bishop’s 
secular lordship, since religious liberty was considered a part of communal 
autonomy and sovereignty. But when the bishop lost his secular power and 
the Valais became a republic of its own in 1628, the Protestants had to con- 
vert or emigrate because the majoritarian Catholics controlled the prevailing 
Zenden of the Upper Valais and relied not only on help from the Catholic 
cantons but also from Spain and Savoy.41 As in the rest of Switzerland, for- 
eign policy and mercenary alliances triggered the clear bipolar boundaries 
and inimical identities of the two religious camps. Still, the traditional and 
well-established ties, the imperatives of everyday contacts, and the media- 
tion of foreigners, especially France, prevented military clashes between the 
parties unless the powers themselves were directly involved, as they were in 
the Grisons.
39 Bundner Gesckichte, 2:113-202; for conflict and cohabitation among the communes in the 
Grisons, see Pfister, Konfessionskirchen, esp. 365-437.
40 Andreas Wendland, DerNutzen der Passe und die Gefahrdung der Seelen. Spanien, MaiLand 
und derKampf ums Veltlin (1620-1647) (Zurich: Chronos, 1995).
41 Schnyder, Reformation; see Chapter 7 above.
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16.11 Conclusion
The 16th century was not an easy time for city republics. Of the Italian com- 
munes, only the merchant republics—Venice, Genoa, and Lucca—survived 
on a peninsula dominated by the Spanish monarchy. The same Habsburg dy- 
nasty subordinated both the Spanish comuneros and the imperial cities of the 
Schmalkaldic League and later fought hercely against the cities that defended 
religious and fiscal privileges in the Netherlands. The demise of the Hanseatic 
League proved that in order to remain independent notwithstanding superior 
princely powers, cities needed either a considerable territory of their own or 
adjacent territories in a league. This was the case for the Swiss Confederation, 
which as a defensive league was able to stand confessional schism. In the eyes 
of most of its contemporaries, diversity in confession was unsupportable from 
a religious perspective and harmful and paralyzing from a political perspec- 
tive. How could a society achieve justice and concord if it disagreed on the 
essential matters of truth and salvation? How could a state find political solu- 
tions or wage war if neither a prince nor shared religious convictions imposed 
unity? If one party sided with Counter-Reformation Spain and depended on 
guerdon and pensions while the other oscillated between a Zwinglian refusal 
of any alliance and loyalty to the Protestants in the Holy Roman Empire and 
France, could there be any lasting political stability or even continuity?
Indeed, the Confederation did experience religious civil wars in both 1531 
and 1656, but this was nothing compared with the French Wars of Religion 
or the Schmalkaldic War, let alone the Thirty Years’ War. Rather surprisingly, 
the cantons managed to remain outside of these conflicts in their immediate 
neighborhood, despite the fact that many Swiss mercenaries served in the op- 
posing camps. With the telling exception of Graubiinden’s passes, Switzerland 
was in the lee of the European monarchs’ strategic interests. Its main contri- 
bution to the international power struggle was its mercenaries, both Catholic 
and Protestant, who fought for any state that paid them. France, which needed 
soldiers most, protected the Swiss equilibrium and mitigated the parties’ dif- 
ferences during conflicts that could compromise its military reservoir.
Both in France and in the Empire, the religious wars were also about the po- 
litical structure in which the estates and the high nobility on one side and the 
emperor and king on the other fought over an absolutist or a corporative con- 
stitution and the respective powers of disposal. The Swiss elites, on the other 
side, were saturated with their rights, their possessions and their archaic con- 
stitution. What diplomats started to label corpus helveticum essentially took 
Switzerland’s present-day territorial shape in the 16th century in both its exter- 
nal borders with neighbors and its internal borders between cantons. Distant
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figure 16.4 Nickotas ofFliie counseling the 13 Confederates while they take theiroath at 
Stans. Painting by Humbert Mareschet (1586), based on a sketch by Christoph 
Murer
PHOTO COURTESY OF THE HISTORISCHES MUSEUM BERN
commitments, such as Rottweil, were abandoned, while Vaud, Neuchatel, and 
Geneva became part of the political and religious Swiss networks. Zwingli’s 
expansionist agenda might have eventually toppled the league of coequal can- 
tons, but after Kappel no military defeat implicated the loss of cantonal terri- 
tories or a centralizing change of the Confederation’s loose constitution, which 
essentially allowed the cantons to remain sovereign.
While there were many differences between the cantons, not only in reli- 
gion but also in language, economic activities, and governmental structure, the 
respective rupture lines were incongruent. The cantonal elites did not differ 
signihcantly from each other socially, but they differed when compared with 
foreign princes and noblemen. They all feared interventions from abroad and 
increasingly barred access to citizenship and offices in order to exclude the
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middling ranks from political participation and foreign immigrants from eco- 
nomic privileges.
What at first glance seemed deficient was, in fact, a rather flexible politi- 
cal framework. Most cantons were religiously homogeneous, hence stable. In 
religiously mixed areas, especially in the mandated territories, everyday prag- 
matism and arbitration prevailed over open conflict, even though familiarity 
with the neighbors of different faith decreased. This was also evident at the 
Diet where confessional plurality made a common foreign policy impossible. 
However, this plurality ultimately benefitted the Swiss because, uncertain as 
they were among themselves about eternal, divine truth, it allowed them to 
abstain from the destructive wars that were being waged over these issues in 
the rest of Europe.
